Why we must not entertain any thoughts of pronatalism

 

The term “Total fertility rate” also often abbreviated to TFR is a widely used, though somewhat misunderstood term today. But what exactly is a total fertility rate?  To put it in simple terms, the term “total fertility rate”, (which is a purely synthetic rate) in the average number of children a woman could be expected to bear in her lifetime based on age-specific birth rates, assuming that she lives till the end of her childbearing age.  The total fertility rate depends on a large number of factors including cultural and economic factors and varies widely from country to country, and region to region. It ranges from a high of 6.6 children per woman in Niger, to 0.90 children per woman in South Korea (both figures are estimates for 2024 by the United Nations population fund). There are of course, several variants of the basic theme. Sometimes, age group-specific fertility rates are also calculated, though this is relatively less common. Total fertility rates are computed or calculated annually for different countries, territories, or geographical areas, and mid-year estimated values are most commonly taken into consideration for this purpose. Total fertility rates may often be used to prepare population projections for a given region, and commonly low variant, medium variant, and high variant projections are also prepared.

Another useful but interesting and interrelated concept is that of replacement total fertility rate. The replacement level total fertility rate is that TFR which is required for a population to exactly replace itself. Even though common sense warrants and dictates that the replacement TFR is exactly two children per woman, this is not most commonly the case; this is because all children may not live till maturity or child-bearing age. Therefore, the replacement level TFR is most often considered to be 2.1 children per woman; this figure is generally true of more developed regions and economies. In less developed societies and economies, the replacement level TFR may be somewhat higher that this, say 2.2 to 2.3 children per woman. Any country or society which achieves a replacement level TFR, can be expected to maintain its population in the long-term. The term long-term is extremely important here, and must be carefully emphasized. We must use the word long-term because there is always a population momentum, and population stabilization occurs only a few decades after, replacement level TFR is attained, usually two or three. Population momentum can be said to occur, because it is not only the number of children per woman that determine population growth, but also the number of women in the reproductive age group or bracket. Population therefore only stops growing when the number of births equals to the number of deaths. The time taken for population stabilization or zero population growth would also depend on other factors such as the intensity of decline of the TFR after it has crossed the replacement threshold, though two or three decades is a reliable mean number.

 

In the field of demography, the theory of demographic transition is a theory which has been widely attested to by empirical data in various societies and cultures over the past two or three centuries. It was initially developed based on observations made by Warren Thompson, Adolphe Landry, and others. This theory refers to, and reflects a historical shift from high birth rates and high death rates in traditional or backward societies with a low level of technological percolation, a low level education, women’s empowerment, and economic development, (in primitive and backward societies, death rates were also high due to wars, famines, droughts, and internecine strife) to a state of low birth rates and low death rates in societies with much more advanced technology, high levels of education, women’s empowerment, and economic development. This theory also maps the different intermediary stages between these two extreme scenarios. For example, in early years populations remained stable because of high birth and death rates – however, a sudden reduction of death rates due to an improvement of medical facilities for example, led to a population explosion. Many countries have now successfully and effectively transitioned to the last state where both birth and death rates are low, or even where birth rates are lower than death rates; thus, doomsayers have been effectively proved wrong. Birth rates have fallen from around five children per woman in the middle of the nineteenth century, to slightly over two children per woman today.

Almost half the world’s population today lives in countries with below replacement birth rates, and birth rates are falling or plummeting everywhere. The only significant exceptions and outliers can be said to be much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and isolated pockets of Asia such as Afghanistan and the Phillipines. Even in these regions or countries, total fertility rates are gradually falling, and it is only a matter of time that these regions or countries reach replacement fertility rates, as and when there is greater economic prosperity, an enhanced standard of living, and women’s empowerment and education, including more employment opportunities for women. Birth rates also decline people more and more people appreciate, and warm up to the importance of education as a vital game changer. Low TFR’s are in many ways a good thing, because it boosts per capita land stock, increases investment in human capital in general, and reduces environmental degradation.  Many people who proposed that religious, cultural and economic factors would play a major role in determining fertility rates have also been partly proven wrong.  Birth rates are falling everywhere, including in developing countries, thereby boosting socio-economic progress to a great degree. The co-relation between the two is very nearly an established fact, and the correlation between these two factors is often bidirectional and multidimensional. 

In India, the importance of family planning was realized by some early thinkers such as Raghunath Dhondo Karve way back in the 1920’s. At that time however, the merits of birth control were not widely realized, and contemporary thinkers such as Mahatma Gandhi and Periyar EVR had a diversity of opinions on the issue of birth control.  In 1952, India under Jawaharlal Nehru, became practically the first country in the entire developing world to implement an intensive government-sponsored family planning program, also called the National Family Planning Program. This program was even built into India’s early five year plans. Among the program's objectives was to reduce total fertility rates in order to slow down population growth, and accelerate the process of economic progress. In keeping with the demographic ideals of the nation, the program was purely voluntary. Hence, initial progress was slow, and the demographic transition in India took place much more slowly than it did in China, and other countries. In India, the TFR in the early 1950’s was around six children per women, very high of course, but way lower that some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa at that time. By 2023, India had already reached its replacement level of fertility, and took over seventy five years after independence, to do so. One mistake early planners may have made was to discount the importance education could play in bringing down birth rates. Thus, literacy rates, particularly women’s literacy rates remained low in the early decades of India’s independence. India’s literacy rate was estimated to be 34% in 1971, and 43% in 1981 according to decadal census figures, which is extremely low indeed. It was not until the 2000’s that more meaningful universalization of education programs such as the Sarva Siksha Abhiyan were launched, and began to have a substantial and a significant impact on various aspects and facets of daily life. The right to education act was not passed by the Indian government until the year 2009.

India at that time also pursued a semi-Stalinist planned economic programme, and it is even said that some planners even believed that India would not  be able to produce or generate enough jobs if too many of its people were highly educated. India therefore pursued a “vertical approach” to family planning, and neglected additional factors such as education, women’s empowerment, poverty reduction, rapid economic development etc. According to some other sources, the importance and the ideals of family planning were also not properly communicated to the masses. While nobody today considers India’s family planning programme to be an absolute or a dismal failure, progress was initially slow and tardy, and the TFR was brought down only very gradually, at least in the initial years. There were also wide variations by region and community, and such disparities were initially not sought to be addressed. In some states, people with over two children were disincentivized from holding government jobs. Monetary incentives were also provided, though these were small. To make matters worse, forced sterilization programmes and campaigns were launched during the emergency of the mid-1970’s, and these appear to have boomeranged and backfired horribly, setting India’s family planning programmes by several years at least, if not several decades. 

However, birth rates have since steadily fallen; Kerala was the first to achieve replacement TFR in 1988, followed by Tamilnadu in 1993, and many other states followed in quick succession. As of 2024, even Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh have reached replacement level fertility, while fertility rates in parts of north India such as Punjab, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh are even lower than that of the south. Uttar Pradesh may not reach a replacement level figure until 2027, in spite of the recent announcement of a new population control policy there, while Bihar and Meghalaya may not reach replacement TFR until the 2030’s. There is a gap between Hindus and Muslims, which slowly appears to be narrowing. An interesting case is however, Jammu and Kashmir which, despite being Muslim majority now has a total fertility rate that is well below replacement. Therefore, we must never over-simplify issues; there will always be a wide range of parameters to be considered. A grounds up and a data driven approach must also always be carried out.

Of late, some groups of people in India (those belonging to different parts of India, as a matter of fact) have begun to draw inspiration from concerns raised by people in different parts of the West and the Far East where birth rates are far, far lower than they presently are in India, and have begun to advocate for higher birth rates. This argument is fallacious, if not outright dangerous. This argument is known as pronatalism, and draws heavily from highly neoliberal interpretations of economic development which blindly (and often fallaciously) equate faster economic development with higher populations. This philosophy also translates into government policy such as incentives for more children, and is contrasted sharply and starkly with antinatalism. This is not only bad for the environment, but is bound to put a heavy strain on natural resources. Such people have also invoked the idea of a “demographic dividend” from time to time. This concept is sometimes heavily misunderstood, and is somewhat of a misnomer. According to the idea of a demographic dividend, sometimes known as the demographic gift, the economy of a country stands to benefit if it has a large number of people, or a large proportion of the population in the working age group. However, there is a caveat here; people must be sufficiently trained and skilled to contribute meaningfully to the economy. Studies have repeatedly shown that parents with smaller families tend to take care of their children better and educate them better. This idea and notion has also been reinforced with data from countries such as China and South Korea. Children born to such parents are then also able to contribute to government taxes better, and even take care of their parents better in such cases. Therefore, all dimensions of any issue must be taken into account and consideration at all times, with data and case studies culled from all parts of the world, and from all cultures, and not just from one narrow geographical region. While we do agree that extremely low birth rates can have negative economic consequences, India is nowhere near that stage yet. In most Indian states, total fertility rates are around 1.7 to 1.8 children per woman (a rate or figure most people would consider ideal), while in some other states, total fertility rates are even higher than that. If birth rates fall to much, much lower levels, than can we begin to worry. Let us not put the cart before the horse.

It is indeed very difficult to define or determine what constitutes an ideal total fertility rate, or a low fertility rate, but we believe it is always necessary to take a local-specific approach. There can be no one size fits all approach. This realization lies at the heart of our strategy. This realization would also, in our view, lead to the fixation and the determination of what we may call the “Ideal TFR”. This we believe, must be fixed by local and national governments in different contexts, and must be determined using a localized and a bottom up approach. It may also be revised from time to time. The Ideal TFR, we could be determined by several factors such as the following.  

1.       Population density of a particular state, country, or region, including a consideration of interstate and intrastate variations, and current growth rates in population. 

2.       Environmental conditions (Vulnerability and susceptibility to global warming) For example, countries like India and the Maldives are generally considered to be more exposed to the dangers of global warming than Russia.

3.       Natural resources: The availability or non-availability of different types and different forms of natural resources must also always be taken into account and consideration. Examples of this include arable land, rainfall, and groundwater availability.   

4.       Economic factors: Economic factors such as per capita income, and current or anticipated standards of living would also be a useful determinant.

5.       Geopolitical factors: Last but not the least geopolitical factors such as the geopolitical stability or the geopolitical instability in the neighbourhood, including perceived threats of aggression must also always be taken into account and consideration at all times.  

We also propose that that the terms “Population management”, and “Demographic management” be popularized, as these would be far more handy and comprehensive than more restrictive terms such and birth control or population control.  Factors comprising population management would comprise and encompass a wider variety or local and overarching non-local factors too. As always we need bottom up research, bottom up gestation of ideas and thought processes – not those that are slavishly and mindlessly borrowed from other contexts and cultures- this realization is the cornerstone of our approach, and forms the bedrock of our philosophy. This approach can also if properly conceptualized and executed, provide a fulcrum and a springboard for meaningful action and progress, and could lead to faster and more equitable development benefiting a larger cross-section of the population. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

 

 

 

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[1] Espenshade TJ, Guzman JC, Westoff CF (2003). "The surprising global variation in replacement fertility". Population Research and Policy Review.

[2] Craig, J (1994). "Replacement level fertility and future population growth". Population Trends (78): 20–22. PMID 7834459

[3] Caldwell, John C. (1976). "Toward a restatement of demographic transition theory". Population and Development Review.

[4] Bruce K Caldwell; Pat Caldwell; Peter F McDonald; Thomas Schindlmayr (2006). Demographic Transition Theory. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer.

[5] Rabindra Nath Pati (2003). Socio-cultural dimensions of reproductive child health. APH Publishing. p. 51.

[6] Mandani, Mahmood (1972). The Myth of Population Control: Family, Caste, and Class in an Indian Village, in series, Modern Reader. First Modern Reader Pbk. ed. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973